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SUMMARY: 1.—Introduction. 2.—Radioisotopes in boxes, the Atoms for Peace initiative, and the 
Mexican connection(s). 3.—The atomic fallout network: radioisotopes in clouds. 4.—Producing, 
preparing and packing radioisotopes in Mexico. 5.—Concluding remarks.
ABSTRACT: The aim of this paper is to describe the early stages of Mexican nuclearization that 
took place in contact with radioisotopes. This history requires a multilayered narrative with 
an emphasis in North-South asymmetric relations, and in the value of education and training 
in the creation of international asymmetrical networks. Radioisotopes were involved in ex-
changes with the United States since the late 1940s, but also with Canada. We also describe 
the context of implementation of Eisenhower´s Atoms for Peace initiative in Mexico that 
opened the door to training programs at both the Comisión Nacional de Energía Nuclear and 
the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México. Radioisotopes became the best example of the 
peaceful applications of atomic energy, and as such they fitted the Mexican nuclearization 
process that was and still is defined by its commitment to pacifism. In 1955 Mexico became 
one of the 16 members of the atomic fallout network established by the United Nations. As 
part of this network, the first generation of Mexican (women) radio-chemists was trained. By 
the end of the 1960s, radioisotopes and biological markers were being produced in a research 
reactor, prepared and distributed by the CNEN within Mexico. We end up this paper with a 
brief reflection on North-South nuclear exchanges and the particularities of the Mexican case.
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1. Introduction (*)
Between the late 1940s and the 1960s, radioisotopes and radioactive 
materials travelled around the world in a myriad of media: boxes, airplanes, 
trucks, containers, and clouds. They also travelled in all directions: East-
West, West-East, South-North and North-South. Some of them travelled as 
commodities, some as raw materials, and some as atmospheric trash. In all 
cases radioisotopes were instrumental in the construction of local nuclear 
projects and the production of standardized nuclear practices through 
the establishment of international networks. Around radioisotopes new 
scientific communities were formed and trained in some of the fields of the 
atomic era: in the Mexican case, cloud radioisotopes played a crucial role 
in the training of radio-chemists, while radioisotopes as commodities were 
used in medicine, agriculture, biology, geology, archaeology, and industry. 
In the mid-1960s both kinds of practices were reunited at the Mexican 
Nuclear Center of the National Nuclear Energy Commission (Comisión 
Nacional de Energía Nuclear, CNEN), built at the village of Salazar, a few 
miles northwest from Mexico City. 
The aim of this paper is to describe the early stages of Mexican 
nuclearization that took place in contact with radioisotopes. But a word of 
warning deserves to be said on definitions of nuclearization, and how these 
reflect assumed points of departure in the writing of history. Although not 
defined in major dictionaries (like Oxford or Webster), nuclearization is 
defined in English as «deployment of atomic weapons by a nation» or «the 
acquisition by a nation, or supplying to a nation, of nuclear weapons» 1; while 
the same term is used in Spanish to make reference to «the substitution 
of traditional energy sources for nuclear sources, and the deployment of 
atomic weapons» 2. We will use nuclearization in its broad accepted Spanish 
meaning, including a broad range of materials (particularly, radioisotopes), 
activities and degrees to which Mexico was involved in nuclear matters.
 (*) Our research has been possible thanks to a research grant from CONACyT (152879), as well as 
a PAPIIT-UNAM research-grant (IN4003143).
 1. Available at: http://www.thefreedictionary.com/nuclearization; http://www.collinsdictionary.
com/dictionary/nuclearization.
 2. Available at: http://es/thefreedictionary.com.
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 In doing so, we follow the idea of Herran and Roqué, that «isotopes 
work as tracers of modern technoscience that invite historical research» 3. 
This idea has been advanced by Angela Creager, who has traced the 
ways in which radioisotopes were introduced into experimental systems, 
circulated and enabled new developments 4. We wish to extend the idea 
in a slightly different direction, namely, understanding radioisotopes as 
tracers of geopolitical relations. Thus, in contrast to earlier accounts of 
the exchanges of radioisotopes between the United States and Europe 5, 
our history requires a multilayered narrative with an emphasis in North-
South asymmetric relations, and in the value of education and training in 
the creation of international asymmetrical networks. 
Mexico´s relation to nuclear things started soon after the bombings of 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and took place along different and simultaneous 
paths 6. On August 22nd 1945, president Miguel Alemán (1944-1950) 
 3. Herran, Néstor; Roqué, Xavier. Tracers of modern technoscience. Dynamis. 2009; 29: 123-130 
(123).
 4. Creager, Angela. Life Atomic. A History of Radioisotopes in Science and Medicine. Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press; 2013. See also n. 5.
 5. Creager, Angela. Tracing the politics of changing postwar research practices: the export of 
«American» radioisotopes to European biologists. Studies in the History and Philosophy of 
Biology and Biomedical Sciences. 2002; 33: 367-388; Krige, John. The Politics of Phosphorus-32. 
A Cold War fable based on fact. Historical Studies in the Physical and Biological Sciences. 2005; 
36 (1): 71-91; Creager, Angela. Radioisotopes as political instruments; 1946-1953. Dynamis. 
2009; 29: 219-240; Creager, Angela; Santesmases, María Jesús. Radiobiology in the atomic age. 
Changing research practices and policies in comparative perspective. Journal for the History 
of Biology. 2006; 39: 637-647; Santesmases, María Jesús. Peace propaganda and biomedical 
experimentation: Influential uses of radioisotopes in endocrinology and molecular genetics 
in Spain (1947-1971). Journal of the History of Biology. 2006; 39: 765-794; Turchetti, Simone. A 
contentious business: Industrial patents and the production of isotopes, 1930-1960. Dynamis. 
2009; 29: 191-217. 
 6. Mateos, Gisela; Suárez-Díaz, Edna. Peaceful atoms in Mexico. In: Medina, Eden; Holmes, Christina; 
Da Costa, Ivan. STS in Latin America: Beyond imported magic. Cambridge: MIT Press; 2014, 
p. 287-303. Mateos, Gisela; Suárez-Díaz, Edna. Tensions between becoming nuclear and 
promoting denuclearization: Mexican nuclear politics, 1950-1970. Conference Dark Matters: 
Contents and Discontents of Cold War Science, Barcelona, May 2013. For other aspects of 
Mexican´s uses of nuclear energy see Azuela, Luz Fernanda; Talancón, José Luis. La historia 
de la energía nuclear en México, 1945-1995. México: CEPE, IIS, IG y Plaza y Valdés; 1999; 
Domínguez, Raúl. Historia de la Física Nuclear en México, 1933-1963. México: CESU-UNAM/
Plaza y Valdés; 2000; Vélez Ocón, Carlos. Cincuenta años de energía nuclear en México 1945-
1995, México: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México; 1997. On Mexican reactions to the 
atomic bomb, Cabral, Regis. The Mexican reactions to the Hiroshima and Nagasaki tragedies 
of 1945. Quipu. 1987; 4 (1): 81-118.
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declared the national oversight and control of all uranium, thorium and 
other fissionable reserves in national soil; in 1950 the so-called Alemán 
Law asserting national ownership over fissionable materials was passed 
by the Mexican Congress 7. In the few weeks after the bombings, national 
newspapers publicized the presence of uranium reserves in the Northern state 
of Chihuahua, and emphasized the importance of scientific development for 
countries like Mexico. Scientists, such as MIT-educated physicist Manuel 
Sandoval Vallarta (see below), and media, joined efforts to ask for stronger 
support of education, universities, and research 8. The outcry complemented 
Alemán´s presidency, which was characterized by a state narrative focused 
on modernization, understood as the need for a rapid industrialization, 
growth of internal markets, as well as promotion of science and higher 
education 9. Indeed, one of the best examples of Alemán´s policies was 
the construction of the new campus of the National University of Mexico 
(UNAM) in Southern Mexico City, where new buildings for the Physics 
Institute and the School of Sciences were located. A Van de Graaff accelerator 
from the High Voltage Energy Corporation at Boston, Massachusetts was 
also acquired as a symbol of modernization 10. Mural paintings by the 
 7. Diario Oficial de la Federación, 26 Ene 1950. Starting in 1946, the United States Atomic 
Energy Commission (AEC) would analyze Mexican uranium ore «transmitted samples» (or 
«dispatches») sent by the US Embassy in Mexico and from individual agents. In general, 
results were negative or, as in the case of dispatch 4821 (October 7, 1947) from the state of 
Chihuahua, «not considered of any significant potential importance». National Archives and 
Record Administration (hereafter NARA), Washington D. C. Record Group 59. General Records 
of the Department of State, General Records Relating to Atomic Matters, 1948-1962, Box 51.
 8. Cabral, n. 6.
 9. After the mid-1950s the discourse of modernity overlapped with that of development, and during 
the 1960s development dominated international relations. For «less developed countries» 
development programs included the peaceful uses of atomic energy (see below). As Sujit 
Sivasundaram has suggested «Indeed, the question of modernity is one that needs to be 
addressed squarely by global historians science. To be modern in a global age of knowledge, 
by the twentieth century, meant using science and technology to intervene in problems of 
hunger, disease and development. Such modernity meant the tying of knowledge into the 
national economy…what is interesting is that modernity did not lead to the flattening out 
of various traditions of expertise across the world. Instead, the modern and the traditional 
coexisted, entangled to the extent that being modern was sometimes proved by recourse 
to rejecting traditions while at other times it was about updating traditions or recovering 
lost ones». Sivasundaram, Sujit. Sciences and the global: on methods, questions and theory. 
Isis. 2010; 101: 146-158 (156).
 10. Though the initial contact to buy the accelerator (at a selling price of $113,000.00 USD) 
occurred in 1950, the instrument was not in place until 1953, installed at the new campus 
of the UNAM, as part of the Physics Institute. The history of the charged ideological and 
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most prestigious Mexican muralists decorated the walls of the campus and 
displayed a visual discourse connecting progress, modernity with science, 
and in particular atomic energy. 
Though Mexico did not have a tradition in nuclear physics at the time, 
a few physicists and engineers, who were well connected with academic 
institutions in the United States, acted as expertise agents for the Mexican 
government in the first years of the United Nations and the nuclear age 11. 
By the time of Eisenhower´s Atoms for Peace speech at the United Nations 
General Assembly (December 8th 1953), a small group of Mexican scientists 
and engineers was becoming already acquainted both with nuclear practices 
and, equally important, with the diplomatic skills required for the new world 
order. This group included the rector of UNAM and Harvard educated 
soil mechanics engineer Nabor Carrillo (the most enthusiastic Mexican 
promoter of nuclear technologies); MIT former professor and Vannevar 
Bush collaborator, physicist Manuel Sandoval Vallarta; UNAM´s Physics 
Institute director Carlos Graef; the first Mexican graduated physicist and 
future director of the Physics Institute, Fernando Alba Andrade; as well as 
former Supreme Court president José María Ortíz Tirado, who would become 
the first director of the Mexican atomic agency (CNEN) in December 1956, 
a few months before the formal constitution of the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA). Though the Atoms for Peace initiative has been 
technical decisions operating in the purchase of the Mexican Van de Graaff accelerator has 
been carefully narrated on the Mexican side by Mateos, Gisela; Minor, Adriana; Sánchez, Valeria. 
Una modernidad anunciada: Historia del Van de Graaff de la ciudad universitaria. Historia 
Mexicana. 2012; 61 (1): 415-442; Minor, Adriana. Instrumentos científicos en movimiento. 
Historia del acelerador Van de Graaff del Instituto de Física de la UNAM (1950-1983). Tesis 
de Maestría; Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México; 2011. The files concerning the US 
Department of State «export license application» for the 2 MeV Van de Graaff point to Nabor 
Carrillo, Manuel Sandoval Vallarta, Alberto Barajas (Director of the School of Sciences) and 
Carlos Graef Fernández as the scientists supervising the acquisition «for fundamental physics 
research». NARA, Record Group 59. General Records of the Department of State, General 
Records relating to Atomic Matters, 1948-1962, Box 51.
 11. This was in contrast to Argentina and Brazil. Hurtado de Mendoza, Diego. Autonomy, even 
regional hegemony: Argentina and the «Hard Way» toward its first research reactor (1945-
1958). Science in Context. 2005; 18 (2): 285-308; Ribeiro de Andrade, Ana M.; Muniz, R. P. A. 
The quest for the Brazilian synchrocyclotron. Historical Studies in the Physical and Biological 
Sciences. 2006; 36 (2): 311-327; Hurtado de Mendoza, Diego; Vara, Ana María. Winding roads 
to Big Science: Experimental physics in Argentina and Brazil. Science, Technology & Society. 
2007; 12: 27-48; Patti, Carlo. The origins of the Brazilian Nuclear Programme, 1951-1955. Cold 
War History (article in the Internet). 2014. (quoted on 17 Dec 2014). Available at: http://www.
tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14682745.2014.968557#.VJHWg4dRZ0s.
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credited with being responsible for the promotion of nuclear technologies 
in the world, the Eisenhower initiative did not produce an unidirectional 
US-government program 12. It was, first, a concerted co-production that 
included federal agencies, industrial funds and universities within the United 
States. In most cases, and in particular abroad, US government agencies (the 
Department of State through the Foreign Operations Agency, FOA) acted as 
branches of universities and industrial funds, while simultaneously dictating 
the US national policy directions. Second, the Atoms for Peace initiative 
soon incorporated and created international agencies (the IAEA in 1957 
being the most obvious). But third and equally important, the Atoms for 
Peace initiative required the involvement (or recruit) of local actors, natural 
resources and infrastructures, governmental funding and standardized —but 
localized— techno-scientific practices in countries around the world. All of 
these elements contributed to shape the Eisenhower campaign in localized 
ways, as we will see in the case of Mexico.
In what follows, we will describe the context of implementation of 
the Atoms for Peace program in Mexico (section 2), which happened in 
consonance with the creation of the CNEN and the IAEA. Radioisotopes 
had been involved as commodities in exchanges starting a few years before, 
mainly with the United States, but also with Canada. The Eisenhower 
initiative, however, opened the door to participate in new training programs, 
which set the context for a broader radioisotope program at both CNEN 
and UNAM. Moreover, in 1955 Mexico became one of the 16 members 
of the atomic fallout network established by the United Nations, with US 
AEC promotion and backing. As part of this network, the first generation of 
Mexican (women) radio-chemists was trained, in contact with radioisotopes 
travelling in clouds (section 3). By the end of the 1960s, radioisotopes 
and biological markers were being produced, prepared and distributed 
within Mexico by the CNEN (section 4). We end up this paper with a brief 
reflection on North-South nuclear exchanges and the particularities of the 
Mexican case.
 12. Recent interpretations of the Atoms for Peace initiative emphasize its central role in the global 
national security strategy and propaganda of the Eisenhower administration. See Medhurst, 
Martin, J. Atoms for Peace and nuclear hegemony: The rhetorical structure of a Cold War 
Campaign. Armed Forces & Society. 1997; 23(4): 571-593; Osgood, Keneth. Total Cold War. 
Eisenhower´s secret propaganda battle at home and abroad. Lawrence: University Press of 
Kansas; 2006, p. 153-180.
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2.  Radioisotopes in boxes, the Atoms for Peace initiative, and the 
Mexican connection(s)
The General Hospital of the Mexican Health and Assistance Ministry 
(Hospital General de la Secretaría de Salud y Asistencia), and the private 
Laboratorios Clínicos de México S. A., received the first US radioisotope 
shipment in 1949. The Iodine-131 cargo had been shipped on August 23th 
from Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL, which had changed its name 
from the Clinton Laboratories in 1948) for the treatment of thyroid cancer 
and related thyroid diseases. Almost one year later, on July 25th 1950, a 
Cobalt-60 shipment arrived to substitute the radio source at the Hospital 
Civil de Guadalajara (in western Mexico) for cancer treatment. In the 
fall of 1947 the US AEC had lifted the radioisotope embargo to foreign 
distribution that had been in place for one year 13, and though the first 
shipment was sent to Australia, the main early recipients were European 
countries 14. Latin American countries, however, also benefitted from the 
recently established international shipment program: in 1947 recipients 
included the atomic regional powers of Argentina and Brazil, as well as 
Colombia and Chile 15. According to the US Atomic Energy Act, exported 
radioisotopes should be used for therapeutic applications and biomedical 
research in their final destinations; industrial uses were forbidden during 
the first years. Moreover, upon reception of the radioisotopes, countries 
accepted that US inspectors could visit their research facilities at any 
moment in order to check how the materials were being used. Given the 
above constraints, it was not until 1954 that the Mexican Light and Power 
Company Ltd. (then, a Canadian owned company) bought a shipment of 
Iridium-91 and Cobalt-60 to Canada for industrial uses 16. 
Economic, political and scientific asymmetries underlie the exchange 
between these «distant neighbors» 17. The radioisotope journeys between 
 13. The Atomic Energy Act had been passed on August 1st of 1946 by the US Congress.
 14. Creager 2002 and 2009, n. 5.
 15. Creager 2002, n. 5. We thank Angela Creager for her generous sharing of information concerning 
international radioisotope shippings in those early years.
 16. Nationalization of natural resources and energy production had reached its climax during Lázaro 
Cardenas’ presidency (1934-1949), when oil companies were expropriated. The process had 
come to a halt in the following decades, but the Mexican Light and Power Company Ltd. 
was nationalized in 1960 by president Adolfo López Mateos. 
 17. Riding, Alan. Distant neighbors. A portrait of the Mexicans. New York: Alfred Knopf; 1985.
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the United States and Mexico played out in the different kinds of materials 
and people who travelled across the «Rio Grande» (from the US side) or 
the «Río Bravo» (from the Mexican side). This point is made more obvious 
when we pay attention to the ways in which US officials characterized the 
nuclear path that Mexico was supposed to follow, via technical assistance, 
as a member of what they classified as the «less developed» countries 18. 
According to a memo of October 20th, 1955, American technical assistance 
was unnecessary for «advanced» countries like the United Kingdom, 
Belgium, France, Norway, and Holland. Then, there was a second group of 
countries where assistance could arrive immediately, including Denmark, 
Japan, Spain, and Italy. And, 
«[…] following these, would come a group of about eight countries worthy of 
attention for immediate development of a longer term program including, as 
the first phase, research reactors and isotope centers. These would include 
Turkey, Mexico, Argentina, Philippines, Pakistan, Israel, Yugoslavia and 
Thailand. Argentina has been listed in this latter group, but might very well 
be included with India and Brazil upon further study» 19. 
Though for some time the US and the Mexican interests coincided, 
the Mexican scientists and government had their own perspective, and in 
the following years they reacted to preserve «national sovereignty», using a 
combination of reliance on international agencies and scientific diplomacy. 
As Krige has pointed out, radioisotopes acted as diplomatic tools in the 
relation of the USA and the rest of the world 20, and during the early years 
of the Cold War Mexicans used them as prime symbols of their peaceful 
(and highly diplomatic) relation to atomic energy, and their differentiation 
 18. As mentioned above the discourse of development took over transactions between the US and 
Mexico (and Latin America) by the mid-1950s. Sivasundaram, n. 9. The inclusión of peaceful 
applications of atomic energy in education exchange programs and other development 
programs is most evident in the creation of the Inter-American Nuclear Energy Commision 
(IANEC) in 1957. The IANEC was part of the Organization of American States in 1957 (and it 
is the subject of a forthcoming paper).
 19. Memorandum from Blythe Stason (Director of Fund for Peaceful Atomic Development, Inc., 
FPAD, and Dean of Michigan University Law School) to W. Keneth Davis, Director of US AEC 
Reactor Development Division. NARA Record Group 59 General Records of the Department 
of State. Office of the Secretary Special Asst. to Sec. of State for Atomic Energy and Outer 
Space. General Records relating to Atomic Energy Matters, 1948-1962. Box 297 (old box 214). 
 20. Krige, John. Atoms for Peace; scientific internationalism and scientific intelligence. Osiris. 2006; 
21: 161-181.
Clouds, airplanes, trucks and people: carrying radioisotopes to and across Mexico
Dynamis 2015; 35 (2): 279-305
287
from the military purposes of atomic energy in the USA and other Latin 
American countries (namely, Brazil and Argentina) 21. The shipment and 
applications of radioisotopes thus implied more than their material journey 
across the border. Radioisotopes symbolized the civil uses of nuclear energy, 
despite the fact that (at least for those materials coming from the USA) 
they were produced by the same instruments used to produce materials 
for atomic bombs 22.
In the case of Mexico the radioisotope trips required that students and 
researchers traveled to the United States to learn radiochemistry, nuclear 
engineering, and radiological methods and applications. In the opposite 
direction, researchers, functionaries, and nuclear advisors travelled to 
Mexico (specifically, to Mexico City), in order to explore, supervise and 
collaborate with the nascent nuclear community. Clearly, radioisotopes 
were not the only ones crossing frontiers. Practices, knowledge, people, as 
well as symbols and meanings, travelled with them. 
The year 1955 was a busy time for the Mexican group, with nuclear 
issues moving fast. Before the International Conference on the Peaceful 
Uses of Atomic Energy took place in Geneva from August 8th to 20th 23, the 
Mexican enthusiasts leaded by Carrillo had already approached a couple 
of US universities to engage in nuclear technical assistance and education 
programs. Gustave Maryssael, President of the Canadian Electric Force 
and Power Co. operating in Mexico, had also joined the group, in search of 
opportunities for nuclear produced electricity. The most important contact 
took place in April 1955, when the Mexicans approached the recently created 
Fund for Peaceful Atomic Development (FPAD), with headquarters in the 
Edison Corporation of Detroit, but operating at the University of Michigan 
in Ann Arbor. The FPAD had been created in 1954 in the aftermath of 
Eisenhower´s speech; it was a conglomerate of industries with transnational 
 21. Mexico did not formally belong to the non-aligned movement (for reasons that are beyond 
this paper); nevertheless, the Mexican government was a close observer of the movement. 
In October 1962 President Adolfo López Mateos («the great denuclearizator of Latin America», 
as some official documents call him), travelled to India, Japan, the Philippines, and Indonesia. 
In India, together with Prime Minister Nehru they signed a joint declaration on behalf of the 
preservation of peace. Vázquez, Josefina Zoraida; Meyer, Lorenzo. México frente a Estados 
Unidos. Un ensayo histórico, 1776-2000. México: Fondo de Cultura Económica; 2001. On 
Argentina and Brasil see n. 11. 
 22. Creager, 2013, n. 5.
 23. The Mexican delegation to the first Geneva meeting included Alba Andrade and Carlos Graef.
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presence (including, among others, the Ford Fund, General Motors and 
United Fruit Co.) and universities (Michigan, California), which acted in 
concert with the US State Department, and whose public face was a large 
endowment called the Michigan Memorial-Phoenix Project (created in 
1948). The purposes of the fund were described as follows:
«[…] to provide an international clearinghouse for the exchange of unclassified 
information with respect to private uses of nuclear forces; to provide 
scholarships, fellowships, and training facilities to permit persons in foreign 
countries to engage in educational programs in the United States relative to 
nuclear enterprise; and to conduct meetings and conferences, both in the 
United States and abroad, for the purposes of promoting knowledge and 
understanding of peaceful uses of atomic energy and for the drafting of model 
regulations and legislation» 24.
E. Blythe Stason, Dean of the Law School at the University of Michigan, 
was designated Managing Director of the FPAD Board, «because of his 
contributions to the new field of the law of atomic energy». Indeed, Stason 
had studied mechanical engineering in the MIT, before graduating in law 
in 1922 from Michigan; then, in 1954 he «had been appointed as Chairman 
of the Special Committee of the American Bar Association on Atomic 
Energy Law». The committee had been involved in the adoption and 
drafting of most of the law of the Atomic Energy Act in 1954 25. Moreover, 
from 1951 to 1959 Stason was involved in research on atomic matters and 
law, becoming a leading world expert on legal issues of atomic energy 26. 
As managing director of the FPAD, Stason also acted as the connection 
between the fund and the US Department of State, besides being a member 
of the Inter-American Bar Association. 
Stason was helped, among others, by Assistant Director Henry J. 
Gomberg, an expert on nuclear engineering. Between May 31st and June 
5th 1955, both Stason and Gomberg and a small committee, arrived in 
Mexico City to meet Nabor Carrillo, at the moment UNAM’s rector. Other 
scientists and functionaries, including Maryssael and Rodolfo Hernández 
 24. The President´s report of regents for the academic year 1953-1954. 57 (17), 8 Aug 1955. Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan Official Publication; 1955, p. 7.
 25. Dethmers, J.R. E. Blythe Stason. Michigan Law Review. 1961; 59: 159-190 (181-182). 
 26. In 1959 together with Samuel D. Estep and William J. Pierce, he had published a huge volume 
entitled Atoms and the Law (Ann Arbor: Michigan Legal Publications; 1959).
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Corzo (Director of the Mexican National Polytechnic Institute, IPN) 
participated in the meeting. As part of the US committee also assisted Ross 
Moore, Director of Technical Cooperation of the International Cooperation 
Administration at the American Embassy in Mexico 27. Among the goals of 
the small committee was:
«[…] to make available to students from Mexico, principally the University 
of Mexico, and the Monterrey Institute of Technology, the facilities and 
experiences of the University of Michigan in the work done under the 
auspices of the Phoenix Project in the field of Atomic Energy […] for the 
purpose of working in laboratories in various aspects of the subject—food 
processing, medical diagnosis and therapy, chemical processing, the handling 
of isotopes, tracing, carbon-14 dating, etc. At the same time specialists from 
the University of Michigan will, on selected occasions go to Mexico City for 
the purpose of cooperating with nuclear physicists in Mexico, in seminars, 
lecture programs and consultations. As soon as a corps of trained Mexicans 
becomes available to serve as technicians and instructors in their own country, 
steps will probably be taken to assist Mexico in establishing suitable radiation 
laboratories and other isotope facilities. […] Eventually this should lead Mexico 
to the experimental reactor stage» 28.
Indeed, the FPAD was instrumental in the education of the first 
generation of Mexican nuclear physicists and engineers, whose influence 
would be felt in the next two decades. 
Moreover, the Mexicans were very enthusiastic of the possibilities 
opened up by the Michigan connection. In the trip report of the FDAP 
commission sent by Stason to the US State Department, he recounted that 
after a meeting on June 1st at the UNAM´s rectory,
 27. According to documents of the Department of State, the US Foreign Operations Agency 
(FOA) changed its name in Mexico, to Technical Cooperation Agency of the ICA, because of 
Mexican «nationalistic sensibilities», who did not like the implications of «foreign operations». 
Nevertheless, in internal documents of the ICA and FOA, the Mexican office used the more 
common FOA nomenclature. Stason, E. Blythe. Report of Activities. Fund for Peaceful Atomic 
Development Inc., January 1 to May 1, 1955, Ann Arbor, 10 May 1955, p. 5. NARA, Record 
Group 59. General Records of the Department of State. Office of the Secretary Special Asst. 
To Secretary of State for Atomic Energy and Outer Space. General Records relating to Atomic 
Energy Matters, 1948-1962. Box 297 (old box 214), 1 entry 3008-A.
 28. Stason, p. 5-6,n. 27. The Instituto Tecnológico de Monterey was funded by the Mexican 
industrialist Eugenio Garza Sada in 1943. 
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«Dr. Carrillo closed the meeting with an unusually fervent and positive 
statement of the desire of the people of the university to participate in the 
development of peaceful uses of atomic energy. His statement was most 
eloquent and effective» 29. 
From the interaction between the FDAP and the Mexican group 
both parts benefited, but not in the same way. One of the first outcomes 
of the visit was that in the summer of 1955 eight Mexican students were 
sent to the University of Michigan to study nuclear engineering, seven 
of them with Mexican funding: Bruno de Vecchi Appendini and Carlos 
Vélez Ocón (from the Light and Power Co.), Arnulfo Morales Amado, and 
Vinicio Serment Cabrero (from UNAM), Antonio Magaña Plaza (IPN), 
Miguel Angel Barberena Vega, and Luis Gálvez Cruz (from the Veracruz 
University); and one receiving a fellowship from the US, Roberto Treviño 
Arizpe 30. From the US side, one of the priorities was the distribution of 
technology and the opening of nuclear reactors markets (for research and 
the production of electricity) to countries with incipient nuclear projects 
and geopolitical interest or significance. Mexico was an ideal target. When 
the first generation of nuclear scientists came back to Mexico, they became 
involved in the creation of research projects, laboratories, and groups in 
several fields at the Physics Institute at UNAM and the CNEN. 
The 1955 and 1957 Geneva Meetings on the Peaceful Applications of 
Atomic Energy acted as catalysts of diplomatic, scientific, industrial and 
commercial agreements, mainly between the USA and countries willing 
to buy nuclear reactors 31. Soon, the USSR jumped in to the international 
nuclear arena, and also offered training programs to other countries, 
including Mexico. Through its Embassy in Mexico City in July 1956 they 
offered studentships «for cadre training (formación de cuadros) […] in 
the uses of atomic energy for pacific ends […] and receive students in the 
Physics Faculty of the USSR». The memorandum also specified:
«The students teaching expenses would be covered by the USSR. Students 
would receive studentships, a grant for acquiring textbooks and school 
materials, a grant for medical treatments in hospitals and for spending their 
 29. Stason, n. 27, p. 2. 
 30. Vélez Ocón, n. 6.
 31. Krige, n. 20. 
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vacations in the USSR; if necessary a grant will be given to acquire clothes; the 
free medical service and lodging in the students residence is guaranteed» 32.
Despite the Soviet offer, most of the Mexican physicists and engineers 
traveled to the US in order to get graduate studies, though later on (in the 
mid-1960s) radiochemists preferred to travel to the UK and France. The 
Mexicans had visible ties with their neighbors, but not always the relations 
between the two countries were easy, even after their WWII alliance. In 
1952, for instance, a US commission had stayed in Mexico City for a two-
weeks long stay, to try to convince the Mexican government and Army 
to sign a bilateral defense agreement, of the type most Latin American 
countries signed in the period. The Mexicans refused, arguing that the 
US military bases to be located in Mexican territory should be run by 
Mexicans 33. Thus, at a time of increasing chilly relations between the US 
and the USSR, Mexico somehow managed to preserve an official neutral 
position, declaring its friendship to its powerful neighbor and at the same 
time keeping a very cordial relation with the USSR. Maneuver space was 
tight, but the Mexicans used it 34. In the middle of this convoluted relation 
there were many areas of «cooperation» and «collaboration». 
3. The atomic fallout network: radioisotopes in clouds
On December 3rd 1955, the United Nations adopted a resolution that 
established the Committee for the Studies of the Atomic Radiation Effects. 
The committee was a response to growing international concerns on the 
effects of atomic radiation, the increase of atmospheric atomic bomb 
detonations, and the armament race, and it had the explicit purpose to 
 32. Becas para hacer estudios en la Unión de Repúblicas Socialistas Soviéticas para Estudiantes. Archivo 
Genaro Estrada de la Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, México. Folder I11/811(47:72)/26370.
 33. Vázquez; Meyer, n. 21.
 34. Thanks to the recent opening of archives concerning Mexican security agencies (the 
Dirección General de Seguridad at the Archivo General de la Nación in Mexico City, in 2002) 
new historical interpretations have been published on the complex position of the Mexican 
government in relation to the US during the Cold War period. For an excellent study see 
Keller, Renata. A foreign policy for domestic consumption: Mexico´s lukewarm defense of 
Castro, 1959-1969. Latin American Research Review. 2012; 47(2): 100-119.
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take fallout measures around the world 35. Mexico, along with other 15 
countries and territories became part of the committee, with the explicit 
commitment to take measures of atomic fallout in different locations, and 
study patterns of propagation. The preparatory meeting took place in 1956, 
and the Mexican representation was integrated by Manuel Martínez Báez 
(a physician that took part of the committee of experts for the creation of 
the World Health Organization), Horacio Zalce Torres (an oncologist and 
founder of the Mexican Society on Oncological Studies) and Alba.
A word is deserved to the atomic fallout network´s composition, 
however. Of 37 chosen locations, 13 were US territories, or British and 
French colonies; six of the 37 were recently decolonized nations, and the 
rest were European and Latin American countries. In many of these places 
colonial-era meteorological and astronomical stations already existed, 
and in countries like Mexico a nascent infrastructure was in place 36. The 
measurements taken in these countries were to be collected in a US data 
bank under the supervision of Merrill Eisenbud’s group at the AEC. Eisenbud, 
who was in charge of the AEC Health and Safety Laboratory, had taken 
similar measures throughout the US since 1952. He and his group also 
developed simple standard sampling methods, which were highly mobile 
around the US territory. As a result of this experience, Eisenbud wrote 
the technical report that worked as the manual imposed as the standard 
protocol by the UN committee to carry out the fallout measures 37. The 
preferred Eisenbud´s methods included the use of «mundane technologies», 
such as gummed paper and water, whose surface was supposed to catch 
the airborne dust that was passed through filter paper and later dry-ashed, 
so the beta activity could be measured by counter instruments (Geiger 
 35. In 1952 the United States had 841 nuclear weapons, while by 1960 this number had increased 
to 18, 683. Krige, n. 20, p. 162. 
 36. The countries and territories belonging to the network were: Canada, Iceland, Bermuda, 
Mexico, Costa Rica, Panama Canal Zone, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, Brazil, Argentina, 
Scotland, Norway, Germany, Morocco, Libya, French West Africa (now Senegal), Nigeria, 
Belgian Congo, Ethiopia, Union of South Africa, Ceylon, Malaya, Japan, Taiwan, Philippine 
Islands, Caroline Islands, Wake Island, New Caledonia, Australia, New Zealand, Johnston Island, 
Canton Island, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Puerto Rico. Eisenbud, Merril. Monitoring network for 
measuring radioactive fallout. Journal of the American Water Works Association. 1956; 48: 
659-664.
 37. Eisenbud, Merrill; Harley, John, Proposed uniform procedures for collection of fallout samples. 
Submitted to the UN Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation. New York: 
United Nations; 1956.
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counters were readily available) 38. The gummed paper method was even 
easier to perform than the water method, and so it became the preferred 
procedure of the international network. Although the manual tried to 
standardize the measurement methods, every national team had to adapt 
them and re-create them to the local environment. Clearly, these were 
cheap technologies, requiring low investment from the US and international 
agencies to carry research in remote locations. However, these technologies 
provided valuable data, eagerly incorporated in the centers of calculation 
situated in the US 39. The committee, thus, illustrates the fact that networks 
are not symmetrical structures: in this case the asymmetry is shown by the 
different roles played by the US and the rest of the countries participating. 
In Mexico City, the new buildings of the recently inaugurated UNAM 
campus (Ciudad Universitaria) provided the landscape in which the first 
radioisotopes clouds were detected and measured. First, the building of the 
Van de Graaff Laboratory (figure 1), then the Sciences Tower (the 10th floor 
was occupied by the Physics Institute) hosted the first fallout instruments. 
Measurements were also taken at the Astronomical Observatory at 
Tonanzintla, Puebla, and incorporated them in the first report 40. Following 
the UN-Eisenbud´s manual, the Mexican team applied the gummed paper 
and the water surface method. The accessibility of these technologies and 
practices is reflected in the description of measurements taken between 
May and August 1956: «Minnesota Manufacturera» brand gummed paper 
was glued to a tin-plate frame over a supporting structure (figure 2). This 
was left at the flat roofs of the buildings between 24 to 48 hours; the papers 
were dry-ashed and passed through different chemical processes, and finally 
beta activity was measured with a «Nuclear Chicago» brand Geiger-Muller 
counter and two ones from the «Anton» brand.
 38. Eisenbud, M.; Harley, John H. Radioactive dust from nuclear detonations. Science, New Series. 
1953; 117: 141-147.
 39. Standardization, understood as the result of the action of «centres of calculation», is crucial 
to understand how countries like Mexico became part of the nuclear era. On the idea of 
centres of calculation Latour, Bruno. Science in Action. Cambridge: Harvard University Press; 
1987. The geopolitical implications of the idea need to be explored for the Mexican-UN (AEC) 
case.
 40. Alba Andrade, Fernando; Beltrán, Virgilio; Brody, Tomás A. et al. Primer informe sobre los estudios 
de lluvia radioactiva. Revista Mexicana de Física. 1956; 5 (4): 153-166.
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Figure 1. Van de Graaff accelerator, at Ciudad Universitaria, México (UNAM´s campus). 
Source: Archivo Histórico de la Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (AHUNAM).
The measures taken by the Mexican group showed the presence of 
radioactive material produced by the «recent atomic detonations in the Bikini 
Atoll and the Australian Sea». They also concluded that the distribution 
of atomic fallout dust was not uniform and that the methods of gummed 
paper and water surface were equivalent during the dry season. These 
results were published as a part of the UN Report on Atomic Fallout and 
in a Spanish version at the Revista Mexicana de Física 41. From September
 41. Alba Andrade; Beltrán; Brody et al., n. 40.
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Figure 2. Experimental arrangement for atomic fallout measurement at different locations in 
Mexico. Source: Andrade, Fernando; Beltrán, Virgilio; Brody, Tomás A. et al.  Primer informe 
sobre los estudios de lluvia radioactiva. Revista Mexicana de Física. 1956;  5 (4): 153-166.
1956 to February 1957 the number of stations taking fallout measurements 
was extended to Oaxaca, Mérida and Guadalajara 42. The samples travelled 
by car or by plane to Mexico City, where they were analyzed by the atomic 
 42. Alba Andrade, Fernando; Brody, Tomás; Lezama, Héctor et al. Segundo informe sobre los 
estudios de lluvia radioactiva. Revista Mexicana de Física. 1957; 6 (2): 97-104; Brody, Tomás; 
Alba Andrade, Fernando; Cameras, Ricardo et al. Tercer informe sobre los estudios de la 
precipitación radioactiva. Revista Mexicana de Física. 1958; 7 (1): 1-26; Alba Andrade, Fernando; 
Brody, Tomás; Palacios, Adelaida, et al. Cuarto informe sobre los estudios de precipitación 
radioactiva. Revista Mexicana de Física. 1959; 8 (1): 61-84; Brody, Tomás; Bulbulian, Silvia; 
Calvillo, José et al. Quinto informe sobre los estudios de la precipitación radioactiva; Revista 
Mexicana de Física. 1962; 11 (1): 1-30.
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fallout group and afterwards collected at the US AEC. Before arriving 
at their final destination in the US, however, they had made use of local 
resources and infrastructures.
On the Mexican side the atomic fallout network opened the opportunity 
for the first generation of radio-chemists to be trained. Since 1954 Mexican 
scientists had participated in the first courses on radioisotopes offered at 
the ORNL. The physicist Fernando Alba Andrade was the first Mexican to 
assist to the radioisotope training course, and in 1955 the chemist Augusto 
Moreno Moreno and the physicist Ariel Tejera had joined the courses. 
Afterwards Moreno and Tejera elaborated the Spanish manual for the 
Mexican courses, which were offered starting in 1958 in Mexico City, by 
the joint participation of UNAM and the CNEN (figure 3).
Figure 3. Radioisotope courses at the Comisión Nacional de Energía Nuclear, México. Source: Archivo 
del Instituto Nacional de Investigaciones Nucleares.
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4. Producing, preparing and packing radioisotopes in Mexico
With the creation of the IAEA in 1957 and the Inter-American Nuclear 
Energy Commission (IANEC), funding for training of Latin American 
specialists in nuclear issues increased, with an emphasis on the uses of 
radioisotopes in agriculture, medicine, and other peaceful applications 
which only indirectly required US technical assistance 43.
During the late 1950s chemical engineer Tomas Brody and Alba 
Andrade were in charge of radiochemistry research in Mexico; but soon 
a group of women took the lead. In September 1957 chemical engineer 
Adelaida Palacios was invited by Brody to do research on the presence of 
90Strontium in milk and biological materials. Palacios published the first 
Mexican paper on radiochemistry in 1959 44. One year later, chemist Ana 
María Martínez became part of the group. Sadly, Adelaida Palacios died in 
1959, although women continued to dominate the field.
In 1961 the Radioisotope Dilution and Radioactive Patterns Laboratory 
was created at the CNEN, under the supervision of Ariel Tejera, who 
had taken the ORNL radioisotope courses in 1955 45. As mentioned, the 
team included many women: chemical engineer Ninfa Guerrero, MSc 
Ana María Martínez-Leal, and the chemist and physicist Silvia Bulbulián-
Garabedian 46. Later on, María Eugenia Ramírez de Arellano became the 
head of the laboratory, followed up by Bulbulián and, at the beginning of 
the 1970s the group was in charge of another woman, Guerrero. Later on, 
a group was created which specialized on nuclear chemistry, and again 
 43. For other parts of the world see Hamblin, Jacob. Let there be light… and bread: the United 
Nations; the developing world; and atomic energy’s Green Revolution. History and Technology. 
2009; 25 (1): 25-48; Zachmann, Karin. Atoms for peace and radiation for safety – how to build 
trust in irradiated foods in Cold War Europe and beyond. History and Technology. 2011; 27 (1): 
65-90; Zachmann, Karin. Risk rays for an improved food supply? National and transnational 
food irradiation research as a Cold War recipe. Deutches Museum. Preprint 7; 2013.
 44. Bulbulian, Silvia; Rivero Espejel, Ignacio A. Historia de la investigación de la radioactividad en el 
Instituto Nacional de Investigaciones Nucleares. Boletín de la Sociedad Química de México. 
2012; 6 (1): 15-26. Palacios, Adelaida; Brody, Tomás; Martínez-Leal Ana María. Métodos de 
determinación del estroncio 90. Revista Mexicana de Física. 1959; 8 (1): 27-41.
 45. The history and impact of the radioisotope courses at Oak Ridge is still to be written. Angela 
Creager has called attention to it, but much remains to be done. For the British courses see 
Herran, Néstor. Spreading nucleonics: The Isotope School at the Atomic Energy Research 
Establishment, 1951-67. British Journal for the History of Science. 2006; 39: 569-586.
 46. Bulbulián; Rivero Espejel, n. 44.
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Ramírez de Arellano was in charge. Henry Maddock, a radio-chemist from 
the Department of Chemistry at Cambridge University, often traveled to 
Mexico City to assist the Radiochemistry Group, always with support 
from IAEA technical assistance funds. More women were incorporated in 
the following decades, including Nuria Segovia, Dolores Tenorio, Suilma 
Marisela Fernández Valverde, and Melania Jiménez Reyes. Both groups 
became the central locus where radioisotopes were produced, prepared 
and distributed in Mexico between the mid-1960s and the 1970s (up to 
now there is a strong presence of women).
A favorable institutional and political context, and a historically 
long presence of women in Mexican chemistry, seem to account for the 
conspicuously dominance of women in radiochemistry 47. The National 
School of Chemical Sciences had opened in 1919 (with antecedents in the 
previous century) as part of the National University of Mexico, and starting 
in 1925 the first woman graduated on chemical engineering. By the 1950s 
almost two hundred women had graduated in chemical pharmaceutics, 
and almost one hundred in chemical engineering. Moreover, as mentioned 
before, the 1950s were a time for modernization in Mexico, and chemists, 
chemical engineers and chemical pharmaceuticals were required in the 
growing metallurgic, oil, textile and other manufacturing activities. The 
academic setting, however, was not open for women, who were confronted 
with several obstacles in their pursuing of graduate studies in the established 
fields. Nevertheless, radiochemistry was a new area of research, less 
prestigious than physics and requiring skilled hands and a willingness to 
participate in a nouvelle setting; thus, the entrance of women into the field 
was a highly contingent matter 48. 
 47. From the early decades of the 20th century chemistry seemed a friendly field for educated 
women: the catholic women´s-only Motolinia University (opened in 1918) offered a degree 
in pharmaco-chemistry. See: González Vargas, Elena. Mujeres universitarias profesionales de 
la química mexicana del siglo XX. México: Universidad Autónoma del Estado de México; 
2013; y Duran-Domínguez de Bazúa, María del Carmen. La mujer en la Ingeniería Química 
de México. Segundo Foro Nacional «La mujer en la Ingeniería Química de México», marzo 
de 2013.
 48. The dominant presence of women in Mexican radiochemistry resonates with the highly 
contextual explanation of women in radioactivity research in Vienna. Rentetzi, Maria. Gender, 
Politics and radioactivity research in Interwar Vienna. Isis; 95 (3): 359-393. There is scarce 
historical research on Mexican women in science; most of it consists of narratives of women 
scientists´ stereotypes and concentrate on personal dispositions and achievements, though 
the numbers and data provided might be useful for further analysis (see n. 47). During 
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The first radioisotope (131I) purchased by the CNEN had been 
imported from Canada in 1962 for therapeutic uses at the Mexican Institute 
of Social Security (IMSS); the place of origin reveals Mexican efforts not 
to be completely dependent on the US. Nevertheless, the ORNL was still 
an important provider for the Mexican users well into the late 1960s, 
while the Dilution Laboratory was in charge of purchases, normalization, 
preparation, and distribution of radioisotopes within the country 49. Mexico 
did not produce radioisotopes until the late 1960s, but in 1962 chemist Silvia 
Bulbulián produced 131I as part of her physics undergraduate thesis; for 
that, she used the experimental reactor from the Atoms in Action exhibition 
that took place in Mexico City between April 2nd and May 1st, 1962 50. 
The exhibition was part of the US AEC´s propaganda activities organized 
around the world by the US Information Agency (USIA) and according to 
local attendants it was a big success 51. The situation changed after Mexico 
acquired its first research reactor, a Triga Mark III. The reactor was bought 
to the US with the mediation of the IAEA in 1966. This decision ran counter 
to the original plan of the Phoenix Project to build a Mexican research 
reactor in collaboration with the FDAP and Michigan University 52.
The reactor was located at the newly built Nuclear Center located 
in Salazar, nearby Mexico City, where the Dilution Laboratory and the 
Reactor´s team had been the first ones to move, in 1966. The reactor began 
to work in October of 1968 (figure 4), and from that moment radioisotope 
production took place in Mexico. Already in 1969 the radioisotopes produced 
reportedly included Sodium-24, Molibden-99, Tecnecium-99, Iodine-131, 
and Gold-198. Some of them had been produced for specific clients, and 
some for general uses in therapeutic, industrial, and research applications. 
an interview with radiochemist Sofia Guillermina Burillo (27 Aug 2014); she recounts the 
obstacles she confronted when trying to do graduate studies in chemical engineering and 
biochemistry. The master´s degree on radiochemistry opened in 1967 at UNAM, and she 
was part of the first generation.
 49. Anónimo. Memoria de Labores de la CNEN 1968-1969. p. 38. México: CNEN; 1969.
 50. Bulbulian, Silvia. Producción de Yodo 131. México: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México; 
1963.
 51. Bulbulián; Rivero, n. 44.
 52. For a personal account on the decisión making process, see Vélez Ocón, n. 6.
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Figure 4. TrigaMark III reactor at Salazar Center in Mexico, circa 1968. Source: IAEA Archive.
They were produced, diluted, packed and distributed in the Mexican 
territory, with a stronger presence in the central and northern regions of 
the country. National distribution of diluted radioisotopes from the CNEN 
reached 3,360 shipments to 67 users in different parts of the country by 
1968, mostly in the central part of Mexico as well as the major cities of 
Puebla, Guanajuato and Monterrey. Importation of radioisotopes gradually 
became less important; however, in the period 1968-1969, 28 different 
radioisotopes were still imported in more than 1,000 shipments 53. 
 53. Reporte de actividades CNEN 1968-1969. Archivo General de la Nación (AGN), Mexico City. 
Acervo de la CNEN; Boxes 10-14. 
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Very soon the CNEN began to produce a new type of material: marked 
biological molecules for research and medical diagnostic purposes. With 
technical assistance from the IAEA, methods to produce these molecules 
were implemented and new compounds produced. The CNEN was also 
producing, for the first time, short-lived radioisotopes which could not 
be imported, including Fluorine-18 and Strontium-87. The yearly report 
emphasized the importance of the new materials for scientific research, 
and indeed, the Mexican markers were being distributed to several research 
institutes and faculties at UNAM and other laboratories 54. Although 
the main consumer was the medical sector, between 1970 and 1974 the 
demand for research radioisotopes augmented, as government agencies and 
universities increased their use. These places included not only the UNAM, 
but the IPN, the Mexican Oil Institute (IMP), the CINVESTAV (Centro de 
Investigaciones y Estudios Avanzados of the IPN), as well as hospitals and 
private laboratories and clinics. The dimensions of the distribution network 
required the establishment of a large and busy administrative apparatus at 
the CNEN, where a file exists for each client 55.
Despite the overwhelming mass of archival material on accounts, 
checks, and bank transactions, it is not easy to calculate the price of 
radioisotopes in the period or the specific radioisotopes being sold to each 
client. However, there is an exceptional document of the Hospital Infantil de 
México (Children´s Hospital) account which points out that on March 1971 
the price of .01mCi of 131I was $110 Mexican pesos, the equivalent to $9.00 
USD of the time; in comparison an analytical balance cost was $1,484.00 
USD 56. What the Mexican National Archive (AGN) allows us to infer is the 
relevance, translated into bureaucratic complexity and paper technologies, 
of the radioisotope distribution program in Mexico during those years. 
Following the new safeguards and international regulations established 
by the IAEA and later by the Latin American Non-proliferation Atomic 
Weapons Treaty, the CNEN concentrated and controlled the distribution 
of radioactive materials within Mexican territory thus becoming the main 
agent of Mexico´s nuclearization.
 54. Reporte de actividades CNEN 1968-1969, n. 53, p. 36
 55. AGN Acervo CNEN, Boxes 10-14, Files 386-593. Unfortunately no detailed information is available 
at the CNEN files concerning overall consumption by the medical and research sectors.
 56. AGN, Acervo CNEN, Requisiciones del Programa de Tecnología, 1972. Box 20, File 841.
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5. Concluding remarks
In contrast to other Latin American countries, Mexican nuclearization was 
and still is defined by its fierce commitment to the peaceful applications 
of atomic energy. One of the few Nobel Prizes awarded to Mexico was 
given in 1982 to Alfonso García Robles, for the promotion of the first 
non-proliferation of atomic weapons treaty, the so called Tlatelolco Treaty 
(signed in Mexico City in 1967), which made Latin America the world´s 
first atomic weapons free-zone. As a national project, denuclearization 
was a mode of nuclearity 57. It meant a geopolitical pacifist position and a 
research program restricted to the peaceful uses of atomic energy. In this 
context, radioisotopes had a privileged role to play: they were imported, 
produced, distributed, and used for medicine, agriculture, biomedical, and 
geological research, archaeology, and industry. Moreover, we have come to 
see Mexican science during the Cold War as deeply shaped by what we call 
the effects of denuclearization: popular distaste towards atomic weapons, 
different resentments towards US’ foreign policies —shaped by an ever— 
present post-revolutionary nationalism—, pacifist high-level diplomacy and, 
ultimately, the promotion of the Tlatelolco Treaty 58.
The nuclearization program was under the complete control of the 
nationalist and modernist executive branch of the Mexican state, which in 
that period meant that techno-political decisions were taken only by a few 
actors. Mexican citizenship did not play an active role in atomic issues in that 
period 59. But scientific experts, even if allied with the government, did not 
always speak in a unanimous voice. For instance, debates during the 1960’s 
 57. Here we use Gabrielle Hecht’s definition of nuclearity: «the degree to which a nation, a program, 
a policy, a technology, or even a material counted as “nuclear” —[it]was a spectrum, not 
an on-off condition. Both nuclearity and its implications emerged in substantive ways from 
the dynamics between Cold War and postcolonial visions of the world». Hecht, Gabrielle. 
Negotiating global nuclearities: Apartheid, Decolonization, and the Cold War in the making 
of the IAEA. Osiris. 2006; 21: 25-48 (26-27). Nuclearity makes reference to a socio-technical 
classification of Mexico within the nuclear spectrum; in contrast to our use of nuclearization, 
as a historical category. 
 58. Gisela, Mateos; Suárez-Díaz, Edna. Tensions between becoming nuclear and promoting 
denuclearization: Mexican Nuclear Politics, 1950-1970. Conference Dark Matters: Contents 
and Discontents in Science during the Cold War, 2013 [unpublished paper].
 59. On the scarce involvement of Latin American societies in the fallout debates of the 1950s, 
and the anti-nuke movement, Wittner, Lawrence. Resisting the bomb. A history of the world 
nuclear disarmament movement, 1954-1970. California: Stanford University Press; 1997.
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about which reactor technologies to acquire —uranium or heavy water— 
were translated into debates on dependency from the US for fuel supply 
versus national sovereignty and technological development 60. Eventually, 
for reasons of national security and a more-than-a-century-long-distrust 
towards their US neighbors, the Mexicans decided to acquire a nuclear 
(US) research reactor, but through the mediation of the IAEA (a history 
that we will pursue in another paper). 
As a transnational model, the discourse of development not only 
dominated the North-South relations during the period, but created the very 
dichotomy of a developed and an underdeveloped world. The «imagined 
geographies» —representing the First World and the Third World—, cut 
the world along a line that implied the transfer of science and technologies 
in one direction, but the obligation to give and accept (different things 
and symbols) in two directions. Development projects ignored the local 
context and were defined as exogenous programs to be applied without 
further consultation with local communities 61. However, as we have seen, 
the Mexican scientists and promoters of nuclear energy were highly active 
and had their own perspective and priorities on the matter. Nevertheless, 
it is clear that their relation to their American counterparts was of a non-
reciprocal character, and situated in an asymmetrical field of power 62. In 
this context, the uses of nuclear technologies were understood as one of 
the high points of development policies during these decades; this fact 
was recognized by all parts involved. Nevertheless, tensions and synergies 
between modernity and nationalism took place, eventually restricting the 
 60. Vélez Ocón, n. 6.
 61. There is a growing amount of literature on development and the Cold War, and the Cold War 
in Latin America. For instance, Escobar, Arturo. Encountering development. The making and 
unmaking of the third world. Princeton: Princeton University Press; 1994; Moon, Suzanne. 
Takeoff or self-sufficiency ideologies of development in Indonesia, 1957-1961. Technology 
and Culture. 1998; 39 (2): 187-212; Nick Cullather. The hungry world. America´s Cold War 
battle against poverty in Asia. Cambridge: Harvard University Press; 2010. Cullather´s first 
chapter deals with the Mexican Green Revolution. On Latin America´s Cold War, Gilbert, 
Joseph; Spenser, Daniela. In from the Cold: Latin America’s new encounter with the Cold 
War. Durham: Duke University Press; 2008; Brand, Hal. Latin America´s Cold War. Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press; 2012.
 62. For a characterization of reciprocal relations in an asymmetrical field of power (USA-UK relations), 
Krige, John. Hybrid knowledge. The transnational coproduction of the gas centrifuge for 
uranium enrichment in the 1960s. British Journal for the History of Science. 2012; 45(3): 
337-357. 
Gisela Mateos and Edna Suárez-Díaz 
Dynamis 2015; 35 (2): 279-305
304
uses of nuclear technologies in Mexico in order to keep the nationalistic 
and non-aligned (for internal consumption) foreign affairs policy 63. 
Finally, radioisotopes do not travel by themselves, as Santesmases 
has argued 64. As we followed them, we have brought to light a broad 
diversity of actors, in different countries and with different roles in our 
history. Radioisotopes also travelled with meanings and implicit or explicit 
commitments that remind us of Marcel Mauss’ concept of gift exchange where 
«to refuse to give [...] is-like refusing to accept [...] a refusal of friendship» 65. 
For the Mexican scientists radioisotopes implied resources, international 
presence, prestige among their national peers, growth and consolidation of 
the scientific community, access to Mexican policy-making decisions, but 
also obligations to comply with US constraints. Such constraints, however, 
changed and adopted more flexible ways as international organisms and 
national production took over importation from the US. At the national 
level, the radioisotope exchange implied a political alliance between two 
countries, which was portrayed as friendship and «cooperation». But it also 
implied supervision, distrust, and control of the knowledge and materials 
produced inside but also outside the US frontiers: Mexico did not produce 
enriched uranium or plutonium despite its mineral reserves (which later on 
proved to be of low quality materials), and this fact only deepened with the 
promotion of the Tlatelolco Treaty. Claims of cooperation and collaboration, 
thus, must be analyzed in their nuanced multi-valent meanings, and with 
their created obligations attached. They do not imply a symmetrical 
exchange or a reciprocal relation, in particular when we deal with North-
South transactions; but it would be misleading to locate all sources of power 
on just one side of the long US-Mexico border. Mexico, as we have seen, 
developed a national path towards nuclearization between the 1950s and 
1960s, which aimed to preserve its autonomy and sovereignty, while at the 
same time exerting a visible international presence. 
 63. Keller, n. 34.
 64. Santesmases, n. 5.
 65. Mauss, Marcel. The gift. Forms and functions of exchange in archaic societies. London: Cohen 
& West Ltd; 1966, p. 11.
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